After becoming president in 2000, Putin lived up to his words and went after the oligarchs who had made fortunes in the energy sector in return for supporting Yeltsin in his hour of need in 1995-96.

One by one they were stripped of their assets and were either jailed, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, or quietly left the country, like Roman Abramovich. Even Abramovich was never really allowed to leave, however; although he took up residence in London and bought castles in Hungary and Montenegro, the orphaned self-made billionaire continues to serve as the governor of the far eastern, resource-rich Chukotka oblast, despite repeated attempts to surrender the throne.

“The citizens of Chukotka were so proud of their top man, they opted to re-elect him in 2005,” says Soukup. “Actually they were more interested in his money as a method of securing investment into local infrastructure than anything else. Besides, the state doesn’t want Roman to fly the coop and take his billions with him, so by keeping him on as governor he stays loyal by default.” In other words, Red Rom may own Chelsea, but the Kremlin owns Red Rom.

After sorting out the oligarchs and renationalising the product, Putin and fellow St Petersburg KGB/FSB siloviki (members of the security structures) such as Alexei Miller and Sergei Ivanov pulled out the stops and began feeding Europe all the gas and oil it wanted, reeling in billions of euros in the process.

This marked, at least for a relatively small number of privileged people (no more than 15% of the population), the start of Russia’s economic miracle. The Russian bear had awoken from a long, drunken sleep that lasted nearly a decade, and like all bears after hibernation, it was very hungry. Russia went on a shopping spree, buying up consumer goods wherever it went.

Today the men in the Kremlin wear suits tailored on Saville Row and get chauffeured around in armoured Mercedes-Benz S-Class sedans. Russians love to demonstrate their wealth in a very cool, categorical manner, as if it’s the way things have always been. Skiing resorts in Austria and Switzerland have become so inundated with Russian petrodollar-enriched visitors that they have agreed to impose quotas so that “other people” can enjoy the snow.

Moscow is currently the most expensive place on the planet, with residential property costing an average of over €3,700 per m². As local real estate brokers who cater to the new Russian elite will calmly tell you, however, you will need to shell out as much as €19,200 per m² for a luxury apartment located in the centre of Moscow. Considering the fact that the average Muscovite takes home €600-€800 per month, it’s a bit of a mystery as to how most people get by in this city of some 12-14 million.

Cranky after years of humiliation at the loss of its once-vast empire, Russia has set its sights on Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and other contenders in its former stomping grounds. It’s now on the prowl in search of more prey, in the form of foreign transport systems – gas and oil pipelines in countries that were once part of either the Soviet Union or its vast network of Cold War-era satellite states in central and eastern Europe, ranging from Bulgaria and Hungary through to Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The Gazprom and Rosneft formula is simple: first, raise the price of the product to a ridiculous level; then, if the customer can’t afford to pay for your gas, get them to sell you their pipes.

Apart from the Putin-KGB-FSB link, there are also elements of organised crime involved in the equation. The FBI has, for example, identified Ukrainian-born Semen Mogilevich as one of the key figureheads standing behind the RosUkrEnergo gas scheme set up in close cooperation with Gazprom to pump Turkmen gas through Russia to Ukraine and then to EU customers.

Mogilevich, who sports Ukrainian, Russian and Israeli passports, is wanted by the FBI, which issued an international arrest warrant for his alleged role in defrauding investors in the US of some $140m (€103m) during the late 1990s.

Gazprom has made no secret of the fact that it would like to acquire German gas giant RWE. Should the move go forward, the Russian state would control Europe’s gas hub and transport networks in the Czech Republic by default, since RWE also owns Transgas. Given Putin’s cosy relationship with former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, this comes as no surprise.

“Moscow’s increasing control of the energy infrastructure and markets in central Europe has long-term implications for the security, and not just the energy security, of all of Europe,” former Putin aide Andrei Illarionov told the BBC after quitting his job in December, 2005.